Judicial Work in the 1980s: Nuts and Bolts by Nejelski, Paul
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 31 
Issue 2 Winter 1982 Article 9 
1982 
Judicial Work in the 1980s: Nuts and Bolts 
Paul Nejelski 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Paul Nejelski, Judicial Work in the 1980s: Nuts and Bolts, 31 Cath. U. L. Rev. 213 (1982). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss2/9 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
JUDICIAL WORK IN THE 1980s:
NUTS AND BOLTS*
Paul Nejelski* *
I have seen the future, and it works about as well as the past, but with
some differences. For many judges, there will be little change because of
institutional constraints. There will, however, be an increased use of non-
judicial, adjudication alternatives. Technology will play a larger role, but
it will create new problems and is not a panacea. The importance of the
bench-bar-client triangle will increase; its proper use will be a predicate for
meaningful change in the future.
Each of these topics could provide the basis for a separate article. My
purpose here is to raise issues to provoke further thought and research,
rather than provide a definitive look at the nature of judging in the next
ten years (a risky business at best). The comments here are largely con-
fined to state courts and civil disputes, although the criminal docket has
had an important impact on the processing of civil cases-both in terms of
numbers and philosophy of case management.
I. INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
There will be little change in the judicial branch because judges and
courts are not masters of their own ships. They are held in perpetual bond-
age by the legislature and, to a lesser extent, by the executive branch. Our
federal and state constitutions and a deep belief in the balance and divi-
sion of powers have established this situation---certainly not concerns
about efficient or even effective management of the courts. (Indeed, some-
times outside forces such as legislative or executive action may be neces-
sary to force tradition-bound judges to make necessary changes).
Court reformers for decades have been fond of saying that the courts
should be run "just like any business." This well-meaning pronouncement
does have some legitimacy. Certainly management principles, accounting,
technology and so forth can be useful. Business principles often have lim-
* Originally presented at the American Bar Association "Conference on the Role of
the Judge in the '80s," June 19-20, 1981, in Washington, D.C.
** Third Circuit Executive in Philadelphia, former Staff Director for the ABA Com-
mission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay. The views expressed in this article are personal
and do not represent the policy of any of the author's present or past employers.
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ited utility, however, because they are constantly undercut by institutional
and constitutional considerations.
The other two branches of government create statutes which change the
jurisdiction of courts, either through. unification or by creating new special
courts. More importantly, they can create new causes of action.' The other
branches also determine the method of selection and criteria for discharge
of judges. They determine the conditions of employment, and, in particu-
lar, they set judges' salaries.2
At budget time, the courts are largely at the mercy of the two other
branches of government. There are often reprisals for unpopular decisions.
This may relate to problems caused by judicial activism in striking down
statutes, imposing new burdens on legislatures, or in raising questions
which lawmakers would rather forget. For example, a court may find that
a mental institution is operating in an unconstitutional fashion and that
new facilities must be built. Although the legislature may comply with this
request, it may not be very favorably disposed to the courts in other deal-
ings--especially for salaries or new programs in the courts.
The courts have some tools of their own to fight back against the legisla-
ture and to keep their own houses in order. Rulemaking is one example.
However, the creation of rules of procedure, management, and even evi-
dence by the supreme court of a state can cause serious conflict with a
legislature which may feel that the court is usurping its elected function.
Consequently, this tool can cause friction and exacerbate, at least in some
instances, some of the separation of powers problems already mentioned.
Some constraints on changes in the operation of the judiciary are, on the
whole, quite good-worth the price which must be paid. For instance, al-
though many are attempting to undermine and limit the function of the
jury, it is often a useful institution for bringing citizens into the decisional
process. It is worth remembering that the right to a jury trial was a hard-
fought touchstone of our liberty. When William Penn was put on trial in
1. In recent years, there has been increased attention to how new causes of action will
increase the workloads of federal courts. See Davis & Nejelski, Judicial Impact Statements:
Determining How New Laws WillAffect the Courts, 62 JUDICATURE 18 (1978); Burger, State
of the FederalJudiciar--1972, 58 A.B.A.J. 1049 (1972). People concerned with the improve-
ment of the justice system have emphasized the importance of planning for the proper allo-
cation of judicial resources. See Hearings on the State ofthe Judiciary and Access to Justice
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration ofJustice of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
2. Some have argued that judges are overpaid-making twice the salary of the average
lawyer. Most--especially judges-would argue that judges are grossly underpaid compared
to what they might normally be making in the larger, more affluent law firms. Issues of
salaries, benefits, tenure, support staff and conditions of employment will have an increas-
ingly significant impact in the future.
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England for practicing his religion, the jury refused to convict him. The
judge found the jury in contempt of court and placed them in prison. Only
after Penn had successfully appealed the case all the way to the House of
Lords was the protection of the jury from official reprisal established.
The jury should not be lightly cast aside as an inefficient anachronism.
But, clearly there is a price for exercising rights. Jury trials are more diffi-
cult to manage and are more expensive than a trial by the court. While the
jury system represents a major constraint upon efficient management of
the judicial system, the key is not to abolish or abridge the right but rather
to improve our management in order to maximize its use.3
Some of the institutional and constitutional restraints are problematic.
The election of clerks of court, which occurs in a majority of our states, is a
good example. The clerk may be running against the judge in the next
election. In any event, a judge often cannot always rely upon his or her
staff for cooperation in efforts aimed toward judicial innovation. The
elected clerk owes no allegiance to the judge. In many jurisdictions, the
only way to get anything approaching reasonable management is to inject
a professional court administrator who must do the work of the clerk.4
An example of restraint stemming from tradition and resulting in poor
court management is the constant rotation of judges. In Maine, for exam-
ple, each of the fourteen superior court judges of the court of general juris-
diction is rotated generally within one of the three geographical areas.
There is rarely an assignment of cases to an individual judge or calendar.
There is only corporate responsibility, with some working hard and others
less so. It is difficult to make improvements because a new approach may
be tried for a month, only to be dropped by the next judge. By and large,
lawyers favor this system because they are afraid they may be stuck with
the same judge year in and year out. The present system gives them con-
siderable opportunity for judge shopping. If they do not like the judge
currently sitting, they simply wait until the next month to bring their mo-
3. For analyses of several proposals to alter the jury system, see Stoever, The Expenda.
ble Resource: Studies to Improve Juror Utilization, JUST. SYs. J., Winter 1974, at 39 (excerpts
reprinted in L. BERSON, S. HAYS, & S. CARBON, MANAGING THE STATE COURTS 239 (1977));
Lumbard, Let the Jury Be-But Modfled, TRIAL, Nov.-Dec. 1971, at 17 (excerpts reprinted in
L. BERSON, S. HAYS, & S. CARBON, supra, at 245).
4. See, e.g., Gable, Modernizing CourtAdministration: The Case of the Los Angeles Su-
perior Court, 31 PUB. AD. REV. 133 (1971) (containing a discussion of the resistance of
county clerks to reform in the court system in the county of Los Angeles); Cheatham, The
Making ofa Court Administrator, 60 JUDICATURE 128-33 (1976) (discussing the task of con-
vincing members of the criminal justice system of the Eastern Judicial Circuit, Georgia, of
the benefits of bringing "business like methods" into the administrative affairs of the judicial
process through the appointment of a court administrator).
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tion. Even the judges like geographical rotation because it relieves the
boredom of being in the same place with the same people, and it provides
some limited recreational travel. It is, however, terrible management. For
example, if you are a judge, why take on a tough case-when you can just
leave it for the judge who will be taking over next week.
The crowded criminal dockets continue to have an important impact on
court management. In the federal area, the Speedy Trial Act5 has resulted
in relatively current criminal dockets, but at the expense of civil cases. In
some federal jurisdictions, a civil case is tried by a magistrate, or it is not
tried at all. State court systems are also stressed, and serious backlogs in
civil cases exist. When I was a court administrator in Connecticut five
years ago, there were six superior court judges in Hartford. In an attempt
to clear up the criminal backlog, five were usually assigned to criminal
dockets. With only one judge on civil, the court was handling only emer-
gency matters and a handful of trials.
In an attempt to clear up a similar backlog, New York state's chief judge
instituted a system for reassigning large numbers of upstate and suburban
judges to New York City to preside over civil cases. The backlog was at-
tributed to "the forced shift of limited resources" 6 from the civil to the
criminal area. The shift resulted in a situation where more than two-thirds
of the 200 supreme court judges in the five boroughs of New York handle
criminal cases and only one-third handle civil cases, instead of the usual
50-50 split. The reason given for the shift was a twenty percent increase in
felony indictments in the city, but, as a result, the drive to cut the supreme
court's civil case backlog was impeded. The spokesman for the chief judge
of the state supreme court noted, "We are now trying to put out two fires
with the same water."
7
A consequence of the underfunding and new burdens being placed on
the courts is an increased sense of frustration for judges. Judges are quit-
ting, and shorter terms may become the norm.8
The lack of adequate resources and support can be particularly frustrat-
ing to judges who have come from private practice. I know of one excellent
judge who quit after two years because he did not have a secretary of his
5. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (Supp. III 1979).
6. N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1981, at 1, col. 6.
7. Id at B9.
8. In the federal judiciary, just a few examples can be named: Wade McCree leaving
the Sixth Circuit to become Solicitor General; Shirley Hufstedler leaving the Ninth Circuit
to become Secretary of Education; Charles Renfrew leaving the federal district court in San
Francisco to become Deputy Attorney General; and Griffin B. Bell leaving the Fifth Circuit
to go into private practice and later to become Attorney General.
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own; at best, he would have to share one secretary with five other judges.
There was no dictating equipment, and everything had to be written in
longhand. He had no personal law clerk for researching questions.
Another institutional problem is simply that judging can be very boring.
It is not for lack of work. There is extremely high volume, especially in the
lower state courts. But these are largely routine matters, and, after a few
years, a judge learns most of the "ins and outs" of a particular type of case.
In such situations, reasonable rotation by subject matter could be a great
help.9 Some judges, however, only want to hear one type of case, perhaps
large civil cases. At the other end of the spectrum, some judges prefer per-
manent assignment to juvenile, traffic, and small claims.
There are solutions to some of these problems, but because of hostility
from the legislature and society at large, it is doubtful that many will be
widely implemented. Sabbaticals or leaves for judges are needed, but it is
doubtful that they will be formally approved by the legislatures. It may be
possible for judges to "do it themselves" by taking a leave of absence for
six months or a year, for example, to teach in a law school or work in a
research facility.' 0
Retirement provisions for the judiciary need to take into account the
possibility that judges will not stay on the bench until they retire. At least
one state has attempted to preclude judges who retire from receiving a
pension if they practice law, although the provision was found unconstitu-
tional." It is doubtful that many individuals would want to join the judici-
ary if they knew that they would be subject to such a penalty for engaging
in the practice of law. There also should be some pro rata system for
judges to receive a reasonable share of a pension which they have earned if
they leave before retirement age. It is of no benefit to the system for judges
to stay in a job beyond their interest or ability.
Hopefully, the 1980's will recognize that judging often will not be a ter-
minal vocation, and that many individuals may become judges for a rela-
tively short time and then go on to some other aspect of the practice of
law. 12
9. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMITTEE ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL AD-
MINISTRATION, TRIAL COURTS § 2.35 (1976).
10. McCree, Sabbatical Rejuvenation.'A Curefor Judicial Blahs?, Legal Times of Wash-
ington, Nov. 3, 1980, at 10, col. 1.
11. See Chairman of the Bd. of Trustees v. Waldron, 285 Md. 175, 401 A.2d 172 (1979).
12. Encouraging shorter terms for judges, however, creates other problems. For exam-
ple, if a judge goes on the bench for a few years of service and then joins a firm which has
litigated extensively in front of that judge, serious problems concerning the propriety of such
moves may arise.
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II. NON-JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES
The United States has had a long history of alternatives to courts. Arbi-
tration, for example, has been a familiar way to resolve disputes for 200
years, especially in commercial cases. 3 Administrative agencies have been
created over the years to deal with special types of cases--often having a
high volume.
The 1980's will undoubtedly see more experimentation with alternatives.
Is this progress? I recently visited the District of Columbia Bureau of Traf-
fic Adjudication, witnessing some cases and interviewing some of the
"judges." In the opinion of the chief judge, the major difference was that
now, instead of having to pay $50,000 for a judge, you could get one for
$25,000. This raises questions, at least in my mind, as to who would want
to have those jobs and for how long. While courts may have problems with
funding and career advancement, these problems may be even worse for
adjudication functions buried at the bottom of a bureaucracy.
Over time, many of these alternative judicial functions, such as adminis-
trative agencies, have been reorganized as courts; for instance, workman's
compensation boards have become "courts," with the referee called a
judge, wearing a black robe, employing the rules of evidence, and having a
three-year backlog. 4
In part because of the underfunding and institutional problems found in
our court system and in part because of courts' heavy reliance on the ad-
versary system, a host of community justice programs have grown up. (An
ABA survey has counted over 140 programs across the country).'5 Many
of these rely on mediation or some other nonadjudicative model which can
be particularly effective as a supplement to the judicial process. Mediation
projects, for example, can be used to determine child custody questions or
the allocation of property in divorce cases. I6 An important challenge in the
next decade is to prevent these alternatives from becoming overwhelmed
13. Nejelski, Jeffersonian/Hamiltonian duality: a framework for understanding the re-
forms in the administration of criminal justice, 64 JUDICATURE 450 (May 1981).
14. P. NONET, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE (1973).
15. For a discussion of the survey, see Nejelski & Ray, Dispute Resolution Alternatives to
Court and Trial, ABA, THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (to be
published).
16. See Pearson, The Denver Custody Mediation Project, 8 COLO. LAW. 1210 (1979). Dr.
Pearson cites the following justifications for mediation as an alternative in child custody
cases: (1) sheer numbers of broken homes; (2) changes in the law away from narrow applica-
tion of specific rules and standards to the "more elusive best interest of the child" standard
which many feel enables judges to act on their own biases and values; and (3) many divorce
settlement agreements do not effectively resolve critical issues and even require additional
court intervention in later years.
[Vol. 31:213
19821 Judicial Work in the 80s
by the same problems of poor case management and starvation of re-
sources which presently pligue the courts.'
Another model for alternatives to court trials is to use someone other
than a judge to adjudicate, or at least to facilitate settlements. Many people
have an initially negative reaction to such proposals, perhaps exemplified
in the fullest by the California Rent-A-Judge program.'8 Such alternatives,
however, have been with us for a long time. Special masters have been in
the federal system, and their counterparts in the state systems, for de-
cades. 9 Referees have been used in all types of judicial proceedings, in-
cluding specific types of cases such as in juvenile court. Recently, the
magistrates in the federal system have been given increased power.20 Tem-
porary judges have been widely used, especially in the sparsely populated
West, with a member of the trial bar sitting for a period of a few weeks.
Temporary judges have also been used as part of crash programs attempt-
ing to clear up dockets.
Settlement facilitation procedures which use persons other than full time
17. P. EBENER, INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, RAND CORPORATION, COURT EFFORTS
TO REDUCE PRETRIAL DELAY: A NATIONAL INVENTORY 87-103 (1981). The report dis-
cusses, inter alia, screening panels to reduce court congestion through the weeding out of
frivolous cases and the promotion of earlier settlement of meritorious claims.
18. See Note, The California Rent-A-Judge Experiment Constitutional and Policy Con-
siderations of Pay-As- You-Go Courts, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1592 (1981). Under CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 638-645 (West 1976), a court, upon agreement of the parties, may order a general
referee for trial of all matters of fact and law. The referee is selected by the parties and is not
required to have any special qualifications, CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 640 (West 1976), except
that following a related procedure under the California Constitution, a referee acting as a
judge pro temp must be an attorney. CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 21. The referee's findings are
treated as findings of the trial court, with final judgment entered when the referee files his
report with the clerk of the court. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 3644 (West 1976).
Criticism of the rent-a-judge type programs include the following: a referee's dispute set-
tlement does not allow for the creation of general rules, and the development of the law may
suffer as a result of litigation that is dealt with through the referee system; litigant financing
may violate equal protection and due process; and closed proceedings may violate the pub-
lic's first amendment right of access to civil trials. See Bird, The Instant Society and the Rule
of Law, 31 CATH. U.L. REV. 159, 167-68 (1982).
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53.
20. In 1968, the Federal Magistrate Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (Supp. III 1979), became
effective in all federal district courts on July 1, 1971, and has been subsequently amended.
For a description of the present role of magistrates in the federal system, see Puro, Goldman
& Padawer-Singer, The evolving role of US. magistrates in the district courts, 64 JUDICATURE
436 (1981).
The Act increased magistrates' civil and criminal jurisdiction. When all parties agree, a
new tier of adjudication is created. Magistrates can assume both case disposition and juris-
diction, conduct jury trials, and decide civil cases. If all parties consent, cases can be sent
directly to magistrates in district courts, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (Supp. III 1979). See also
McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV. J. OF LEOIS. 343 (1979); Sinclair,
Responsibilities are Growingfor U.S. Court Magistrates, THE NAT'L L.J., Sept. 1980, at 22.1
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judges are increasing. In New Jersey, for example, a retired judge is sitting
by consent of both plaintiffs and defendants as a private estimator of the
value of medical malpractice claims, where liability is admitted but the
damages are in doubt.2 ' Each side puts on its case in relatively quick fash-
ion, and the "facilitator" gives an estimate of the value of the case. Cases
have been settled quickly at or near the amount determined by the
facilitator.22
Similarly, in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, an experimental dispute resolution mechanism was developed
in a patent infringement suit between two large corporations.2 3 The proce-
dure was a nonbinding "mini-trial" before top corporate officials and a
neutral advisor who previously had served as a United States Court of
Claims trial judge. In an article written by the attorneys in the case, the
author reported that the entire procedure took only two days of presenta-
tion time, and "within one-half hour of the close of the procedure, the
parties reached a settlement in principle of what had been a long and bit-
terly fought lawsuit.
'24
A factor which may increase the use of these and other types of alterna-
tives is the specialization of the law and the bar. Historically, the ideal has
been that the judges of the court of general jurisdiction should be general-
ists by training and by inclination. The specialization of the law and the
bar suggests, however, that while the need for the generalist model will
prevail, there is a growing need for specialists who can handle certain
types of cases more effectively. Since in many of the alternatives to tradi-
tional trials the parties will have chosen the judge, they presumably will
have greater faith in that person's decision as well as greater willingness to
abide by the schedule and other dictates of their judge.
Whether the trend toward adjudication by nonjudges is good or bad
depends on a number of variables, such as:
(1) Who serves in these alternatives, and how they are selected;
(2) Whether the reference is voluntary by the parties or is mandated by
court or statute;
(3) Who pays for the services of the adjudicator;
2 5
21. Telephone interview with Judge Alexander Waugh (Sept. 1981).
22. Id
23. See Green, Marks, & Olson, Settling Large Case Litigation. An Alternate Approach,
II Loy. L.A.L. REV. 493, 501 (1978).
24. Id
25. In Connecticut, an alternative is provided as a public service by the state from a
pool of retired judges who are paid by the taxpayers. CONN. GEN STAT. § 524-34 (1980). In
the California alternative, the parties pay their own judge. The cases may be put on quickly
[Vol. 31:213
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(4) Whether the decision is final.2 6
These alternatives provide competition for a state monopoly. Whether it
is education, law enforcement or any other service, if the state is the only
provider, there may be little urgency to provide adequate services. One
problem with alternative approaches, however, is that the private market
will become a forum solely for complicated cases where parties have the
resources to purchase their own justice. Some judges with whom I have
spoken find this to be a problem. Others say that they are delighted to see
any cases removed from the system.
Will these alternatives simply create the same problems which face our
courts now, but with less visibility and less ability to obtain resources in
the long run? For example, the traffic adjudication bureaus, being at the
bottom of a bureaucracy, may encounter greater difficulty getting funds,
space, and resources than the judiciary. At least four medical malpractice
panels have been held unconstitutional because of long delays and an ex-
cessive amount of resources spent in their administration.27
Courts will have a new role in administering and monitoring some of
these alternatives.28 Should courts take on a general responsibility for
monitoring these alternatives by taking quality control measures, such as
random study of unappealed cases, to assure that proper procedures have
been used and correct decisions reached?29
III. TECHNOLOGY
Technology can be helpful, but it is not a panacea. A study conducted
by the National Center for State Courts on computer-assisted transcription
of the record shows that few of the state-operated systems are cost effec-
tive, and few result in either a greater number of pages per case reported or
and inexpensively-perhaps an hour for each side-rather than through a long, drawn out
trial which the parties have no incentive to expedite. CAL. Civ. PRoC. CODE §§ 638-645
(West 1976). See Weisman, Shortcut to Trial- Use of Orders ofReference and Judges Pro
Tern, 3 Ass'N Bus. TRIAL L. REP. 3 (1980); Retired Judges Hired to Decide Lawsuits in Pri-
rate, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1980, at A 25, col. 1; Hill, Rent-A-Judge: California isAllowing its
Wealthy Litigants to Hire Private Jurists, Wall St. J., Aug. 6, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
26. If the case can be appealed quickly and easily to a regular court, a tier of quasi-
courts may be superfluous and only add to the expense of the litigants. Moreover, if cases
initially decided using an alternative to courts may be appealed in the normal fashion, they
will be years ahead of cases that were initially decided in courts. Such alternatives may
impose serious new workloads on appellate courts.
27. See P. EBENER, supra note 17, at 91-94.
28. For a discussion of the role courts might play in alternative dispute resolution, see
Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111 (1976).
29. See Nejelski & LaPook, Monitoring the Juvenile Justice System: How Can You Tell
Where You're Going f You Don't Know Where You Are?, 12 AM. CalM. L. REV. 9, 28 (1974).
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a speedier transcript.30 Nevertheless, there will be many opportunities for
the application of technology in the courts in the 1980's:
(1) Video-taped depositions of testimony is one example,3 although
the greatest potential use of taped depositions may be as a settlement de-
vice, rather than for use at trial if a witness is unavailable;
(2) Computer statistics concerning the time aspects of case loads
should result in better management of the system;
(3) Telephone conference calls will become commonplace. Research
by the ABA Action Commission shows that over forty judges hold mul-
tiparty telephone conferences on a regular basis to conduct pretrial mo-
tions and other business.32 Extensive experiments are being conducted in
Maine, Colorado, and New Jersey.
33
The list of potential technological improvements is long, but the exper-
iences with technology, already introduced in some courts, should be ex-
amined before new technological tools are introduced. Change is complex.
In Maine, the introduction of telephone conferences to hear civil motions
required at least five other changes to be made. For example, judges had to
be assigned to motions for specific periods of time, and two counties were
merged for the purpose of hearing motions. There are many consequences
of technology, some intended, some unforeseen.
The ability to generate statistics about judges also presents difficult pol-
icy questions. To what extent should statistics about individual judges be
made public? While data on caseload and delay for each judge are rou-
tinely published in some jurisdictions, court administrators have been
known to be fired for even attempting to make this information public. A
more sensitive and potentially dangerous subject is the compilation of sen-
tencing records of the judges, collectively or individually.
IV. THE BENCH-LAWYER-CLIENT TRIANGLE
Court reform in the past understandably has been largely from the top
down. The judges are concerned about their workload and related admin-
istrative problems. Too often, the client has been forgotten. As former
Chief Justice C. William O'Neill of Ohio pointed out, much of past court
reform has been a concern only to judges and professional court reform-
30. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION IN THE
COURTS 47-106 (1981).
31. O'Neill, How to Force Faster Litigation, JUDGES J., Winter 1979, at 7, 9.
32. See Hanson, Mahoney, Nejelski & Schuart, Lady Justice-Only a Phone Cal/Away,
JUDGES J., Spring 1981, at 40, 42.
33. Id The projects are under a grant from the National Science Foundation and Na-
tional Institute for Justice and involve criminal as well as civil cases.
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ers.34 Examples of such reforms include unification of courts, merit selec-
tion of judges, and higher salaries and better pensions for judges." These
improvements have very little impact on the elimination of delay or the
cost of litigation.36
The 1980's should bring about an increasing concern by society and by
the judges about the client. Judges, for example, are beginning to send
notice to the client when the case is filed. In the past, there have been cases
where some lawyers simply interviewed the client and failed to file a com-
plaint for months or years after the case should have commenced-all the
time blaming court delay for the lack of action. Similarly, courts are begin-
ning to require notice or even consent of the client for the continuance of a
trial.
Judges have become increasingly concerned about case management.
Much of this concern stems from the speedy trial requirements of statutes
and constitutions of criminal adjudication.'Clearly, there is a strong public
interest in eliminating delay in criminal trials. Innocent people may be
sitting in jail before trial, or dangerous persons may be out on pretrial
release because trials take so long. The interest in speedy resolution of civil
cases, however, is less clear. Often, at least one party in civil litigation
wants delay. In commercial cases, questions of prejudgment interest and
inflation are important. If you owe $100,000, would you rather pay it now
or in five years-when inflation will have diminished the amount greatly,
and, in the meantime, the money can be invested at high interest rates?
What is the lawyer's role in increasing the efficiency of the court system?
With 500,000 lawyers in this country, it is difficult to generalize. Some law-
yers are concerned about such issues, while others are content to benefit
from the inefficiencies of the system. I would predict, however, that the
next decade will evidence these trends:
The need for limitation of discovery. Many lawyers conduct excessive
pretrial discovery for fear of malpractice allegations. Also, a considerable
amount of money is made by "papering" a case." If the number of deposi-
tions and interrogatories were limited in some manner, there could be an
objective standard for judging performance.3"
Lawyers becoming part of the planning process. The bench-bar commit-
tee in Phoenix, Arizona is an example of cooperation between judges and
34. O'Neill, supra note 31, at 7.
35. Id
36. Id at 7-8.
37. Green, Marks & Olson, supra note 23, at 498-99.
38. See Proposed Amendment to F.R. Civ. P. 26(b), COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES (June 1981).
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lawyers. In most jurisdictions, however, the ABA Action Commission and
other reform groups perform shuttle diplomacy between bench and bar.
Lawyers are not accustomed to being part of the planning process. Often,
they would rather sit back and criticize the judges and the system. They
are going to have to recognize a positive obligation to improve the admin-
istration of justice---even if it hurts their practice financially.39
Emphasis on training for litigation. The size of the bar has mushroomed
in recent years, and there are many young lawyers with little training in
litigation. Fifty percent of today's lawyers have had less than ten years of
practice. Law school has been an almost total failure in preparing people
for dispute resolution and litigation. Our law schools today have almost
nothing to do with training lawyers to operate in the real world. Further-
more, apprenticeships, such as the New Jersey Preceptor System which re-
quired a nine-month apprenticeship to a judge or member of the bar, have
been abolished. Virtually the only way to get training now is with a large
firm or in the government.
Increased attention to the relationship of law office management to case
management. One cause of court delay is that files become lost in the law
firm; a firm simply may be unaware that it has the case.4 ° This is an area
where the courts can help lawyers through the use of automated informa-
tion systems.
Judges grading lawyers. It has become common practice for the lawyers
to grade judges through bar polls. Judges may start rating the lawyers. At
the least, there should be some kind of post-mortem, especially for long
cases, to discuss the reasons a case was tried in a certain fashion and why
certain expenses were incurred. This type of scrutiny is increasing in judi-
cial review of petitions for attorneys' fees.4 '
Judicial liability. There may be increases in judicial liability, with
judges being sued because of failure to move cases and provide proper
superintendance.
V. COST OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
The courts of the 1980's increasingly will have to pay for themselves.
39. Lawyers, in some cases, have opposed changes in the law that would have resulted
in improvements in the judicial system. For example, the personal injury bar virtually killed
no-fault insurance. Many cases simply do not belong in court, but lawyers have resisted
alternatives.
40. Private interview with Judge August Goebel of Los Angeles, California (May 1980).
41. See, e.g., City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448, 469-70 (2d Cir. 1974);
Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 493 F.2d 292, 297-98 (3d Cir. 1974); Lindy Bros. Bldrs.,
Inc.v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 167 (3d Cir. 1973).
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Courts always generate revenues through fines or filing fees. Often, for the
sake of appearance, these revenues go into the general fund and do not
directly benefit the judiciary. But, in speaking to a state legislature, a court
official almost invariably attempts to justify the judicial budget by refer-
ence to the amount of revenue generated by the courts. Consequently, in
an age of shrinking resources, it may not be unrealistic to see the imple-
mentation of such controversial measures as both higher filing fees and
"user" fees where a party elects trial by jury, and an occupational tax on
lawyers to help run the court systems.

